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SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT

American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law and
Section of International Law and Practice
Report to the House of Delegates
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED that the ABA recognizes that in issuing Antitrust
Guidelines for International Operations, the U.S. Department of Justice
is performing a significant public service by setting forth its analysis of a
wide variety of transnational transactions; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the ABA urges the Department
of Justice to revise the draft Guidelines to make clear in such Guidelines
where the Department's enforcement position departs from established
law or lacks substantial legal support, specifying the variance in each
case; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the ABA urges that in considering
finalization of its draft Guidelines, the Department of Justice should take
into account the following suggestions:
(i) Discussion of several topics not covered in the draft should be added,
including the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to export arrangements; the relationship between antitrust laws and the legal regimes governing international transport; the act of state doctrine; and the
Department's use of Civil Investigative Demands on foreign parties;
(ii) The Guidelines should acknowledge the role of the courts in dealing
with jurisdictional issues and defenses, in both government and private
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antitrust litigation, relating to foreign affairs. These issues include the
foreign sovereign compulsion defense, petitioning foreign governments,
the act of state doctrine, and the application of Parker v. Brown to foreign
state action;
(iii) Revival of the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine should
not be endorsed;
(iv) The section on foreign sovereign compulsion should take account
of the substantial authorities indicating that (a) it is the fact of compulsion
not its form, that should be the focus of the analysis; (b) inquiry into the
validity of the foreign state's activity may be limited by the act of state
doctrine; (c) the defense rests on fundamental fairness principles, and
pragmatic judgments about the preservation of foreign commerce, as well
as comity;
(v) The Guidelines should address the authorities supporting the proposition that a doctrine analogous to the Parker v. Brown state action
doctrine applies to foreign government-regulated conduct;
(vi) Consistent with former Department of Justice practice, the Guidelines should support application of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to petitioning of foreign governments;
(vii) Merger analysis in the guidelines should be consistent with the
Department's existing Merger Guidelines or, where at variance, the difference and the Department's new policy should be clearly articulated;
(viii) The relationship between the trade and antitrust laws should be
more fully explored.

REPORT
Introduction
International antitrust has grown in importance with the increasing
economic interdependence between the United States and the rest of the
world. The Department of Justice's draft Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations' are important to all who deal with competition law
and policy. This is so for two reasons: first, the need to reconcile the
requirements of several sovereign nations has become more urgent as
transnational arrangements have proliferated; and second, the antitrust
principles described in the Guidelines will normally apply to purely domestic cases as well.
1. 53 Fed. Reg. 21584 (June 8, 1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 22426 (June 15, 1988). See also the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide for International Operations dated January 26,
1977, revised March 1, 1977, and the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law,
Task Force Report on that Guide (54 Antitrust L.J. 839 (1985)).
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The American Bar Association's Section of Antitrust Law and Section
of International Law and Practice (the "Sections") consider it important
to provide comments on the draft Guidelines, because these issues are
significant and involve difficult questions of law, and because in our view
the draft does not adequately address the relevant legal authorities. 2 Due
to the short comment period provided, the Sections limited their comments to what they believe to be the most important points raised in the
draft.
The discussion that follows is organized by topic, rather than page-bypage. In Section I, we address the general question of the nature of
guidelines issued by the Department of Justice ("the Department"), including the distinction between "the law" and "enforcement policy," the
utility and purposes that Guidelines may serve, and the audience that the
Guidelines should reach. We also point out several areas that were not
addressed in the June 8 draft that we believe should be included in the
final version issued by the Department. Section II moves on to certain
specialized international and jurisdictional issues, including the role of
comity in international jurisdictional determinations, the applicability of
the Parker v. Brown3 state action doctrine to the acts of foreign governments, the appropriateness of applying Noerr-Pennington4 immunity to
the petitioning of foreign governments, and the Department's apparent
decision to revive the Bernstein5 exception to the act of state doctrine.
Section III discusses the various substantive antitrust doctrines that appear in the draft Guidelines, including antitrust aspects of mergers, vertical restraints, intellectual property law, and the relationship between the
trade laws and antitrust.
i. Overview of the Draft Guidelines
A.

THE NATURE OF THE GUIDELINES

Department of Justice Guidelines can serve several purposes. First,
they can simply inform the outside world about the enforcement priorities
that a particular Administration has adopted. Second, where the law being
enforced is unclear in certain respects, they can explain how the Justice

2. The list of members of the Task Force, the authors of the Report, is attached as
Appendix 1.
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
4. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1964); and California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
5. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansch, Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); cf. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe anonyme, 163 F.2d
246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
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Department interprets that law, indicating when conduct will be viewed
as illegal by the Department, and when not. Third, they can represent an
effort by an agency with special expertise to "contribute to the orderly
development" of the law, functioning effectively as a brief to courts or
Congress and not purporting to represent the law as it presently exists.
In the introductory section of the draft, the Antitrust Division announces its purpose in issuing these Guidelines:
These Guidelines are intended to provide practical guidance concerning the
Department's internal antitrust enforcement policies and procedures...
[A]lthough the Department believes that the analysis stated in these Guidelines
is economically and legally correct and consistent with the trend in
the courts,
6
these Guidelines are not intended to be a restatement of the law.

This statement indicates that the Department is drawing a distinction between its enforcement policy and the existing case law, and purports to be
restricting its remarks to enforcement policy. 7 While it is clearly the Department's prerogative to decide what it wants to say when it issues guidelines, given the great respect that the public at large has for official statements
of the Department, it is extremely important that the Department make
clear at critical points throughout the Guidelines whether it is describing
current enforcement policy, existing law, or desired changes for future developments in the law. Most of the audience for these Guidelines-business
executives, in-house counsel, and general antitrust practitioners who do
not deal with international cases on a daily basis-lack the expertise in
U.S. antitrust law to make these critical distinctions on their own. In addition, foreigners both in and outside of governments are likely to read the
Guidelines as an official statement of the content of and their exposure under U.S. antitrust law. Accordingly, when the Department "speaks," it must
let its audience know whether it is'stating the law or only its enforcement
policy-not just in an introductory caveat, but at key points in the Guidelines when its position does not restate established law.
For instance, it is stated that the Department views as illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act only restraints of trade that would create
or facilitate the exercise of market power. Accordingly the first step in
the rule of reason analysis is to determine whether the restraint has that
effect: if not, the analysis goes no further. 8 Putting aside the question

6. 53 Fed. Reg. 21584, 21585.
7. Thus, these draft Guidelines differ from the 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines,
which in addition to discussing enforcement policy, also expressed a desire to contribute
to the orderly development of vertical restraints case law. Vertical Restraints Guidelines,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) Par. 13,105 (Jan. 23, 1985).
8. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21587 Cols. 2 and 3.
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whether this would be a desirable approach for antitrust, aside from some
decisions dealing with nonprice vertical restraints it does not describe
present-day doctrine in the courts. 9

Readers of the Guidelines could rely to their detriment on these statements. The lack of definition between law and enforcement policy undercuts the force of the Department's opinions on those many areas of

antitrust law where clarification is all that is needed. As the Department
revises the draft Guidelines during and after this comment period, it should
take care throughout to make clear the precise nature of its various statements, including the fact that, despite the Department's enforcement policy, actual litigation may proceed differently. 10
To be helpful, these Guidelines should concisely restate the antitrust
laws, as they apply to foreign commerce cases. 1' When the law is somewhat unclear, they should indicate the way in which the Department
interprets it. If the Department wishes to go further and to argue for
changes or extensions, the Guidelines should clearly indicate that this is
what is being done. Once the law is explained, enforcement priorities
within that law should be identified. To assist in this regard, the Sections
refer in this report to case law which should be addressed in the final
form.

B.

12

SUBJECTS OMITTED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE GUIDELINES

Although the draft covers many issues quite thoroughly, such as joint
ventures, technology licensing, and mergers, it does not address other
9. See, for example, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10, where the Supreme Court made it clear,
in the context of a rule of reason analysis, that if a naked restriction of price or output
exists, market power is not, and never has been, necessary. Another example is the discussion of Noerr in Case 13, in the paragraph bridging pages 21613-14 and the following
paragraph, which appears to reject the view expressed in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983) to the effect that
bringing a lawsuit may constitute an antitrust violation even if the action is ultimately
successful. If that is the Department's enforcement policy, it should be stated.
10. Compare 1984 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) Par. 13,103, at 20,555
(June 14, 1984) ("[t]he Guidelines are designed primarily to indicate when the Department
is likely to challenge mergers, not how it will conduct the litigation of cases that it decides
to bring").
11. The final version of the Guidelines should include more citations to and discussion
of authority-the leading cases that support key propositions.
12. Additionally, it would be preferable for the Guidelines to be a joint statement by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. As an alternative, it would be
helpful for the FTC to publish either its comments on the Department's Guidelines, or its
own Guidelines. Statements of enforcement policy that do not reflect FTC input can be
misleading for foreign enterprises who rely on the Guidelines, if not for guidance on antitrust
liability in private challenges, then at least as statements of predictable U.S. government
position.
SPRING 1989
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subjects that are also of central importance to international antitrust. We
have identified four such subjects: the application of the U.S. antitrust
laws to export arrangements; the relationship between antitrust laws and
the legal regimes governing international transport (i.e., shipping and
aviation); the total omission of the act of state doctrine; and the use of
Civil Investigative Demands in investigations of foreign parties.
1. Exports. The most important statements about normal, non-government funded, export commerce occur in the Introduction and in Case 10,
footnote 197.13 The Introduction to the draft Guidelines states:
[n]or is the Department concerned with the export conduct of U.S. firms except
where that conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on price and/or output in the United States or where the U.S.
government is the purchaser, or substantially funds the purchase, of affected
goods or services. 14

Rather than devoting a hypothetical case to this important topic, the draft
suggests in a footnote the "special circumstances" in which these criteria
might be satisfied. The implication of footnote 197 is that the only cases
that would raise antitrust problems are those in which exporters made an
agreement on export levels with the purpose and effect of reducing supplies within the United States, and cases involving re-exports into the
United States. The footnote adds the point that foreign-initiated restrictions on the export trade of U.S. exporters "would not have the requisite
direct effect on U.S. commerce to trigger antitrust concern."
These are controversial propositions which we believe require more
straightforward discussion than the present draft offers. For example, the
basic statement relating to export commerce is a significant revision,
legislative in nature, of the antitrust implications of export commerce
compared with the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(FTAIA) quoted a few pages later in the draft.15 A clear premise of the
FTAIA is that injury to a U.S. exporter's export business in the United
States can give rise to an antitrust claim.16
2. TransportationServices. Given the significance of antitrust issues in
transportation industries, such as the ocean shipping investigation and
the trans-Atlantic air carrier cases, it is unfortunate that this subject was
not included in the draft Guidelines. When it is necessary to reconcile
competing regulatory regimes, such as the Shipping Act and the antitrust
laws, or the various international air transport agreements and the anti-

13.
14.
15.
16.

53 Fed. Reg. 21586-87, and 21610.
Id. at 21586-87 (footnote omitted).
See 53 Fed. Reg. 21595, col. 1.
15 U.S.C. § 6a(I)(B) and (2).
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trust laws, guidance from the Government with respect to its enforcement
policies and intentions would be welcome.
3. Act of State. The total omission of the act of state doctrine, notwithstanding multiple references to the so-called "comity based" defenses, is surprising. 17
The act of state doctrine has been recognized in U.S. court decisions
at least since the 1897 decision in Underhill v. Hernandez, and was discussed in the 1977 Guidelines.' 8 The later decision in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino held that the Judicial Branch may invoke the doctrine
when it believes that a court decision would "hinder rather than further
this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere." 19 Both textual discussion
and a hypothetical case should be added to indicate the circumstances
under which a party arguably subject to the U.S. antitrust laws might
nonetheless be entitled to assert an act of state defense.
4. Civil Investigative Demands. Another point on which the draft Guidelines offer little assistance is the Department's practice with respect to
Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) served outside the territory of the
United States. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1311-1314,
specifically authorizes the Department to serve CIDs on persons outside
the territory of any court of the United States, by using the methods of
service set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). At two points in
the draft Guidelines, the Department indicates that it would use this authority to supplement its other enforcement efforts. 20 Unfortunately, these
references raise more questions than they answer. These questions include
(1) to what extent would the Department moderate the exercise of its CID
enforcement powers in light of the jurisdictional reasonableness factors
mentioned in the draft, (2) to what extent would foreign blocking statutes
be respected by the Department, and (3) what outer limits on this extraterritorial discovery power does the Department recognize. As past conflicts with foreign nations attest, excessive exercise of the CID power
may give rise to international tensions. Furthermore, to say that CIDs
raise only procedural issues, or relate only to investigations, does not
mean that they have no place in guidelines devoted to a discussion of
enforcement policy. If anything, the contrary is true. Given the longstanding and crucial nature of such discovery disputes it would therefore be
helpful if the Department's discussion of the use of CIDs were amplified
in the Department's final product.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See also II.C. infra regarding the revival of the Bernstein exception, and II.D below.
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
53 Fed. Reg. 21586 n. 22 and 21602 col. 1.
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II. Specialized International and
Jurisdictional Issues
The Guidelines address a number of concepts involving the legal limits
of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction in foreign commerce. These include comity,
foreign sovereign compulsion, the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, and an undefined notion of "comity-related" defenses. 2 1 However, although those
areas unique to transnational transactions should receive special focus in
the Guidelines, these terms are not precisely explained and the concepts
underlying them are not interrelated.
There is a further problem with the Department's coverage of the limits
on jurisdiction: the Department's characterization of recognized defenses
to antitrust liability as exclusively based on comity is unsupported in
substantive law. While considerations of comity play a separate role in
the exercise of prosecutorial orjudicial discretion, comity in no way limits
the availability or modifies the application of established antitrust defenses.
A.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH V. PRIVATE SUITS

The most controversial portion of the draft Guidelines' discussion of
issues related to "comity" is the assertion that because the Constitution
charges the Executive Branch with responsibility for the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations, it would be improper for a court to dismiss a suit brought
by the Executive Branch on "comity-related" grounds: which the Department takes to include foreign government compulsion, and presumably act of state, as well as aspects of jurisdiction. The Sections believe
that this broad assertion, which is repeated throughout the draft, is unsupported by the case law.
There has been wide consensus for years that the courts play an important role in the law of foreign relations. 22 As early as 1812, the Supreme
Court (Marshall, C. J.) decided whether the government of France should
enjoy sovereign immunity for a claim against one of its armed national
vessels. 23 The comity aspects of recognition of foreign judgments were

21. See, e.g. 53 Fed. Reg. 21616 n. 232.

22. See, e.g. American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States:

The special place of the judiciary in United States jurisprudence is as significant
for the law of foreign relations as for other United States law. Judicial review gives
the court power to invalidate actions of the political branches in foreign relationsstatutes, international agreements, and executive actions, as violations of the Constitution. § 1, Reporters' Note 4, at 11 (1987).
Also, L. Henkin, "The Courts in Foreign Affairs," in Foreign Affairs and the Constitution,

ch. VIII, (1972).
23. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. 116 (1812).
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involved in Hilton v. Guyot.2 4 The Supreme Court applied principles of
international law in The Paquete Habana.25 More recently, of course,
Congress has delegated to the courts the task of deciding when sovereign
immunity should be recognized for foreign governments or their instrumentalities, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.26
It would be hard to argue that immunity determinations have no effect
27
on foreign relations.
For antitrust suits brought by the Department, the Guidelines, without
discussion of these established precedents, state that the evaluation of
foreign interests under the comity test should be made by the Executive
Branch only, meaning the Department of Justice, and that courts shall be
restrained from dismissing or limiting such suits on the basis of comity:
In the Department's view, government actions should not be subject to dismissal
on the basis of comity. A decision by the U.S. government to prosecute an
action amounts to a determination by the Executive Branch that the interests
of the United States supersede the interests of any foreign sovereign and that

the challenged conduct is more harmful to the United States than would be any
injury to foreign relations that might result from the antitrust action. Thus,
government suits do not create the risk raised by private actions that a judicial
28
finding of liability will intrude on the legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns.

As to whether courts may take account of the effect of antitrust prosecution on United States' foreign relations, another footnote states the
Department's belief:
[Tihis factor should [not] properly be considered by courts in the context of
either private litigation or in litigation initiated by the United States, since the
29
conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally reserved to the Executive Branch.

This broad assertion of executive power fails to note that the Congress
is given responsibility under the Constitution for regulating commerce
among foreign nations (Article I, Section 8). The Sherman Act was passed
pursuant to this Constitutional authority. Nothing in that Act frees the
Executive Branch from having to comply with its provisions. On the
contrary, the Sherman Act may reach conduct by U.S. government officials. 30 There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate
24. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
25. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1602-11 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
After the court entered a default judgment, the State Department suggested that the judgment
be vacated in the interest of U.S. foreign relations, 23 Int'l Leg. Mat. 402 (1984). Subsequently the judgment was set aside and the action was dismissed, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D.
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1371 (1987).
28. 53 Fed. Reg. 21595 n. 112.
29. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596 n. 115.
30. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) and Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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that the Congress intended one standard to apply to government prosecutions and another standard to apply in private suits.
The Department cites no judicial precedent for this dual but divergent
application of the antitrust laws other than a general (but largely unarticulated) reference to the separation of powers doctrine. Nor is there any
indication that courts would accept the argument that they were constrained from reviewing prosecutorial decisions on the basis of comity or
from taking account of foreign relations considerations. Contrary to the
statement in footnote 232 of the draft Guidelines, 3 1 it would be improper
for an Article III court not to construe the Sherman Act in the face of
an Executive Branch assertion that it must apply that Act in foreign
32
commerce as it and not the Congress deems appropriate.
B.

JURISDICTION

The Department of Justice has stated that the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA) codified a jurisdictional standard that the
Department applies generally, not only in Sherman Act export cases, but
in Sherman Act import cases and cases under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act as well. The Department states it will attempt to give meaning to the
terms "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" [effect] in the Act
by taking action where there is, or would be, a significant adverse effect
on consumers in the United States. This is correct in principle, particularly
as the House Report on the bill which became the FTAIA indicates that
the rule was regarded as being of general application. 33 The Guidelines,
however, should state the test as requiring an anticompetitive effect in

31. "The Constitution charges the Executive Branch with responsibility for the conduct
of foreign relations of the United States. It would be improper for a court to review the
Constitutional actions of the Executive Branch [in bringing a foreign commerce antitrust
case by adjudicating comity-related defenses raised in a government suit]" (53 Fed. Reg.
21616 n. 232).
32. See generally, Webster v. John Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (June 15, 1988) (where Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of Executive action, its intent must be clearly expressed).
The principle of separation of powers assumes a role for each of the three branches of
government, not, as the Department states, only for the Executive. Congress passes laws
affecting foreign commerce. The Executive administers those laws, and conducts U.S.
foreign policy consistently with those laws. The courts construe that legislation and determine the legality of executive action consistent with that legislation, with the Constitution
and with standards that the courts define for themselves. International law is part of the
law of the United States, except to the extent that Congress has decreed otherwise.
Congress has not, in the antitrust law, abrogated international law. See, e.g., Marshall,
C. J., in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804): "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . ."
33. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (1982).
VOL. 23, NO. I
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the United States, as set out in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank
34
CardAss'n.

The Guidelines also take a controversial view of conduct relating to
export commerce that satisfies the FTAIA standard. The draft Guidelines
suggest the Department's skepticism about the wisdom of the essential
facilities doctrine. 35 The net result seems to be a rejection of a possible
antitrust suit being brought involving, for example, a claim that rival
exporters unlawfully predated against a U.S. exporter's business, or a
claim that a certain export facility was essential to doing business in a
specialized foreign market, or a claim that a foreign monopsony inflicted
antitrust injury by depressing the prices that an exporter received.
The draft may cause confusion over export commerce issues in another
respect. The language of the draft recognizing a potential antitrust claim
where there are effects on "price and/or output" in the U.S. can be read
as reviving the old Minnesota Mining & Manufacturingcase. 36 If so, the
draft might be interpreted as suggesting potential antitrust liability resulting from a joint venture's decision to use foreign sourcing.
The Guidelines continue with the assertion that the Government considers the legitimate interests of other nations before taking enforcement
action, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. It is, of course, appropriate
for the Department to do so. The Guidelines then proceed to offer opinions
on what the law of jurisdiction ought to be, without specific reference to
developments in the law or to previous positions articulated by the
Department.
The Guidelines imply that any assertion of jurisdiction by the Government is per se reasonable and not subject to judicial review as long as it
satisfies the FTAIA standards. While no one could prevent the Department from so arguing to a court, it is doubtful that any federal court would
subscribe to such a broad claim. By whatever name is chosen-jurisdictional rule of reason, Timberlane, or objective territoriality-there are
principles of international law that allocate competence among nations,
and which have been recognized in the federal courts. The Guidelines
should discuss important developments like the Restatement (Third) of

34. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). (The formulation is stated correctly in the draft Guidelines
at 53 Fed. Reg. 21584 col. 3, for example, but not given in full on p. 21595 col. I, in the
section entitled "Jurisdictional Considerations.")
35. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 21607, col. 3, and 21608, col. 1.
36. See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950). The arrangement challenged in 3M had the effect of reducing output in the
U.S. in two ways. First, the defendants themselves were manufacturing overseas for foreign
markets instead of using their U.S. plants, which obviously meant less U.S. output. Second,
the combination (according to the court) precluded defendants' American competitors from
receiving business from the foreign markets that they might otherwise have gotten.
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the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 37 case law like Timberlane
and Mannington Mills, 38 and its own prior support for the appropriateness
of judicial oversight. 39 In addition, it may be anomalous for the Depart-

ment to support legislation such as S. 539,40 giving the courts the responsibility of weighing factors relating to the reasonableness of a
jurisdictional assertion, and at the same time to assume that the courts
will suddenly perform a poor job if the plaintiff happens to be the United
States.41

C.

REVIVAL OF THE BERNSTEIN EXCEPTION

The draft Guidelines imply that the courts should not recognize the act
of state defense when the Executive Branch tells them not to. This is
tantamount to a revival of the Bernstein exception to the doctrine, under
which, when the Executive Branch represented to the courts that application of the act of state defense would not advance the interests of

37. Reporter's Note to section 403 of the Restatement states that jurisdictional reasonableness in the extra-territorial application of U.S. law is not solely a matter of discretion,
but required by principles of international law.
38. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). See also
Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 896 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1001 (1982); Industrial Investment Development Corporation v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d
876, 883-5 (5th Cir. 1982). Cf. Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
There is also notable international support for the principle. A number of states, such as
Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have expressed the view that the widely
accepted kindred doctrine of "moderation and restraint" is based on principles of international law that require each state to respect the sovereignty of every other state. Swiss
authorities for example, "submit that this approach derives from the international legal
principle of sovereign equality of states and two corollary rules: a state may only exercise
jurisdiction in situations evidencing substantial links with it; and a state should refrain from
intervening in the internal affairs of another state, directly or indirectly, especially in the
sphere of the latter's territorial jurisdictional." Minimizing Conflicting Requirements: Approaches of "Moderation and Restraint," Report on OECD Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprise (1987), at 9-10. Other states have discovered support for the principle of reasonableness in the state practice of respect for the laws and
policies of other nations. Meessen, "Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International
Law," 78 AM. J. INT. L. 783,803 et seq. (1984).
39. See the comments of then Assistant Attorney General Shenefield in 1978:
"I fully recognize that unique factors are involved in the foreign commerce
aspects of enforcement and I intend to ensure that we give them adequate consideration. If we neglect to do so, then it is clear to me that the courts, under
Timberlane, should rein us in."
Shenefield, "The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice," in Perspective on the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust and Other Laws (. Griffin ed. 1979).
40. S. 539, 100th Cong., IstSess. (1987): see 53 Fed. Reg. 21595 n. 114.
41. The draft does not say whether the FTC should be treated as a government or private
plaintiff for this analysis. (See also n.12 above.)
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American foreign policy, the courts followed that advice. 42 The fact that
the opinion of the Executive Branch in the classic Bernstein cases was
communicated in the form of a letter from the Department of State, and
here would be communicated by the filing of a lawsuit, is immaterial. In
any event, the difference is not explained.
A majority of the Supreme Court expressly rejected the Bernstein ex43
ception in FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacionalde Cuba, in 1972.
Only recently, the Third Circuit revisited the doctrine in Environmental
Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., and again concluded "that the De-

partment [of State's] legal conclusions as to the reach of the act of state
doctrine are not controlling on the courts." 44 No court has adopted the
position that Executive Branch lawsuits are exempt from the act of state
doctrine. In Associated Container Transportation (Australia), Ltd. v.

United States, the court simply decided that the invocation of the act of
state defense to protect communications sought by a Civil Investigative
Demand was premature. 45 Nothing in the court's discussion indicated,
however, that the doctrine does not apply to govemment-initiated litigation.
D.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION

The Guidelines accept only the existence of "an implied (and thus
limited) defense" based on "notions of comity," that is "not properly
46
regarded as a legal defense in antitrust suits brought by the United States."
It is said to apply where: (1) the foreign sovereign actually compels the
challenged conduct under circumstances in which a refusal to comply
would give rise to significant penalties; (2) the foreign sovereign's command is within "the scope of its authority under its own laws";

47

(3) the

compelled conduct did not occur wholly or primarily in the United States;
and (4) U.S. deference to the foreign sovereign's action is warranted under
the circumstances.
We consider each of these elements in turn.
The requirement that there be actual compulsion rather than mere encouragement or acquiescence by the foreign sovereign is a well established
42. Supra n.5.

43. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
44. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,994 at 58,096 (3d Cir. 1988). The decision itself reinforces
the premise of judicial independence. The court disagreed with the Legal Adviser's suggestion that the act of state doctrine did not apply to the award of the contract in question,
on the ground that the award might not have represented a sufficiently formal expression
of Nigeria's public policy. It agreed, however, that adjudication of the case would not be
embarrassing to the political branch's conduct of foreign relations, placing considerable
weight on the Executive's opinion on the latter point.
45. 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983).
46. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596 col. 1 and n. 118.

47. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596.
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element of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. 48 The Guidelines
add a gloss by stating that the refusal to comply with a foreign sovereign's
mandate must "give rise to significant penalties (as opposed to the mere
denial of benefits, for example)." 49 This "penalty/loss of benefits" distinction is inconsistent with Texaco Maracaibo, where the threat was loss
oil from Venezuela, 50 and with prior Antitrust Diof the right to export
51
vision practice.
It would also be helpful for the Guidelines to state clearly that it is the

fact of compulsion-not the form of compulsion-that should be the focus
of any inquiry. In their amici brief in the Matsushitacase the governments
of Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom pointed out:
[T]he determinative inquiry for a U.S. court is whether the foreign sovereign
exercised its authority to mandate the relevant conduct. The fact that a foreign
sovereign may express itself in a manner other than by explicit, compulsory
orders may reflect a different style of governance, not a less intense involvement
in the issue .... Inflexibility by U.S. courts in requiring explicit formal orders
would discriminate improperly in favor of governments with centrally planned
and highly regulated economies and would elevate the form of52 the foreign
sovereign's involvement over the substance of that involvement.

The Guidelines' second requirement, that the foreign sovereign's command must have been "within the scope of its authority under its own
laws," raises the issue of the act of state doctrine. The plaintiff in Texaco
Maracaibo contended that for the defense to prevail, the Venezuelan
Government's acts must have been valid under Venezuelan law. The court
rejected that contention because an inquiry into the validity of the acts
was barred by the act of state doctrine. 53 Numerous cases 54 and

48. Cases in which the foreign government has specifically authorized and actively
supervised the private conduct may qualify for the Parker defense: see infra II.E.
49. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596.
50. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1294.
51. For example, in the Oil Cartel consent decrees, certain otherwise prohibited acts
were exempted from the decrees if the defendant acted "pursuant to request or official
pronouncement of policy" by a government within whose territory the act would be performed and "where failure to comply with [such] request or policy would expose [the
defendant] to the risk of the present or future loss of the particular business in such foreign
nation." E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co. (NJ), 1969 Trade Cas. Par. 72,742 § V(c)(2)
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
52. Amicus Brief at 10 (June 15, 1985).
53. 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298-99.
54. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(C.D.Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Occidental of
UMM al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A. Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
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commentaries 55 support the correctness of that holding. After the pub-

lication of a similar statement in the original Guide 56 a Justice Department
official conceded that the statement appeared to contradict the act of state
doctrine and, consequently, needed to be clarified. 57 In our view this

aspect in the Guidelines needs elaboration. Although the validity of the
58
sovereign's act may have some bearing on the existence of compulsion
there is substantial authority to indicate that a court may be limited in
any inquiry into the "validity" of the acts of a foreign sovereign.
Although the Guidelines 'ecognize that the third element, the "territorial test," is often "difficult" to apply, 59 the Department states that it
"will not generally recognize" the defense where the compelled conduct
"plainly has occurred wholly or primarily in the United States ... "60
This territorial preference is in accordance with the weight of opinion on

the issue, 6 1 although it may be inconsistent with the decision in Texaco
62

Maracaibo.

Finally, the Department asserts that "foreign sovereign compulsion is
not properly regarded as a legal defense in antitrust suits brought by the

55. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 443 (1987); J. Atwood & K. Brewster, Antitrust and American
Business Abroad 265 (2d ed. 1981); 1 B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 614 (2d ed. 1987).
56. 1977 Guide, at 54 ("The act upon which the defense is based must be the act of a
truly sovereign entity acting within the scope of its powers under the law of nations.")
57. Rosenthal, "An Overview of the Guide and its Objectives," in Perspectives on the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust and Other Laws 82,91 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
58. For example, defendant's failure to challenge a clearly unlawful order issued without
even plausible authority is certainly relevant in determining actual compulsion. Good faith
compliance is used as the test under the Uniform Commercial Code in connection with
excuse of non-performance of contracts. Section 2-615 excuses non-performance where the
party proves "compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign ... governmental
regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid." U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977). See
generally T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 2-393 to 2-399
(1978).
59. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596.
60. Id.
61. Restatement (Third), supra note 23, at § 441 Comment b. See Linseman v. World
Hockey Assn., 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324-25 (D. Conn. 1977) (Canadian government compulsion order may not shield a boycott of a hockey league, implemented in the United States,
of players under 20 years of age); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M.
155, 629 P.2d 231, 263 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). ("We cannot agree
with the proposition that if a foreign state compels an American corporation to take actions
in the United States which are intended to and do have severe adverse consequences to
free and fair trade in the United States, the American corporation is thereby immunized
from the full force of the laws of its own sovereign.")
62. Although the issue was not discussed directly, the defense was upheld as to a refusal
to sell oil to a particular company after the oil had been processed in a bonded refinery in
the United States.
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United States," 63 although it recognizes the defense in private suits. This
follows from the Department's view that the defense is based solely on
comity, together with its insistence that only the Executive Branch may
evaluate comity-based issues in government-initiated suits.
Comity clearly is one basis of the defense but it is not the only basis.
Courts and commentators have consistently identified at least two other
bases-fairness64 to the defendant and the need to preserve the existence
of commerce.
It is a fundamental tenet of U.S. law that a defendant lacking free will
should not be held liable for his conduct. This fairness policy was expressly recognized in Texaco Maracaibo, the one decision upholding the
defense on the facts:
-[I]t requires no precedent . . . to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the
a nation compels a trade
right to regulate commerce within the nation. When
65
practice, firms there have no choice but to obey."

Several leading treatises on international antitrust law cite "fairness" as
67
66
a basis of the defense, one citing it as the "most important" basis.

The only acknowledgment of the fairness rationale in the Guidelines appears in footnote 117: "abstract and undefined notions of 'fairness' to
firms that engage in anticompetitive conduct should not obstruct the legitimate prosecution of antitrust offenses ... "68 Given the well developed body of law on fairness, duress, necessity, mens rea and related
concepts, "fairness" is no more "abstract" or "undefined" than other
basic legal concepts employed in ourjurisprudence for hundreds of years.
The third basis of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense is not mentioned in the Guidelines. That basis is the pragmatic judgment that the
antitrust laws should yield where their application would eliminate, rather
than restrain, commerce. As the Justice Department observed in defending limitations in the Bechtel consent decree, the goal of competition in
U.S. commerce is not usually advanced by placing American firms in a

63. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596 n. 118.
64. Even if comity were the only basis, there is no authority for the Guidelines' view
that the defense would be inapplicable in government-initiated lawsuits.
65. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. See also, O.N.E. Shipping, Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 453 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. pending, (no. 87-1350): "... where as

here the conduct of the appellees has been compelled by the foreign government they are
entitled to assert the defense of foreign government compulsion and the act of the state
doctrine is applicable." (Footnote omitted.)
66. Supra note 55. But see Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws, section

2.26, 2.27 (3d ed. 1982).
67. Hawk, supra note 55, at 614.
68. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596, n. 117.
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position where it is impossible for them to conduct business. 69 The Texaco
Maracaibo court explained this "self-evident"

proposition as follows:

Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not restraints of
commerce, as commerce is understood in the Sherman Act, because refusal to
comply would put an end to commerce. American business abroad does not
carry with it the freedom and protection of competition it enjoys here, and our
courts cannot impose them. Commerce may exist at the will of the government,
and to impose liability for obedience to that will would eliminate for many
companies the ability to transact business in foreign lands. Were compulsion
not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a government order would
have to choose one country or the other in which to do business. The Sherman
70
Act does not go so far.

E.

THE PARKER DOCTRINE

The Guidelines acknowledge that the Sherman Act does not apply to
private anticompetitive conduct taken pursuant to clearly articulated policies of a state within our federal system, which is subject to the active
supervision of officials within that state. 7 1 The Guidelines assert, however,
that it would be inappropriate to apply such a state sovereignty defense
to foreign commerce. Two principal reasons for this view are given. First,
it is suggested that since the federal government retains authority, under
the Supremacy Clause, to void state-promoted cartels, the federal interest
in promoting competition is not fundamentally undermined by accepting
the sovereignty of U.S. domestic states to promote anticompetitive conduct within their territory in isolated cases. This does not apply to international commerce. Second, to review the extent of foreign government
officials' supervision of anticompetitive conduct within their territory
"would require difficult inquiries into foreign sovereign's conduct of its
own affairs."

72

69. "[A] judgment without [the limiting provisions] would have jeopardized the continued conduct of any business by the defendants (and possibly others) in Arab Countries.
" Without
.. exceptions the decree "may have appeared to impinge upon the sovereignty
of Arab League Countries over their internal affairs with a possible result that, instead of
opening up this commerce to United States Blacklisted Persons, it would be closed off
entirely for all United States Prime Contractors and Subcontractors." Further, placing the
defendants at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other American companies and foreign
contractors would be "a result inconsistent with the Department's objective, under the
antitrust laws, to promote competition." Competitive Impact Statement for Proposed Consent Judgment in United States v. Bechtel Corp., 42 Fed. Reg. 3716, 3723 (Jan. 19, 1978).
For the decree as entered, see 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,429 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
70. 307 F. Supp. 1291 at 1298.
71. 53 Fed. Reg. 21596 col. 3, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) and Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
72. See the discussion at p. 21596 col. 3.
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In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court looked to the intent of Congress
in passing the Sherman Act and concluded that:
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative
as the Sherman
history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted 73

Act declared that it prevented only "business combinations."

There is nothing in the Sherman Act legislative history to indicate that
the Congress intended it to reach foreign government-regulated conduct
either. The Guidelines do not discuss how the Sherman Act can be enforced against such conduct without such a clear legislative intent.
The courts have properly recognized that Congress did not intend to
exercise jurisdiction over all foreign conduct affecting U.S. markets, especially where "international complications [are] likely to arise" under
conflict of law standards. 74 U.S. prosecution of foreign persons acting
lawfully pursuant to the clearly articulated policies of foreign states and
pursuant to ongoing supervision by those states is especially likely to
create such international complications. Moreover, as the Supreme Court
noted in considering the scope of proper U.S. maritime jurisdiction in
foreign commerce, Congress should not be presumed to have intended
U.S. commercial law enforcement jurisdiction to require the application
of U.S. law in the face of competing laws enforced by foreign governments
in respect of conduct with which this nation is less significantly connected,
in the absence of clear language to that effect. 75 These precedents support
the proposition that the Parker doctrine applies internationally.
Precedent aside, there are sound reasons for applying the Parker doctrine internationally. Sovereign foreign states, entitled as a matter of international law to equal status with the United States federal government,
deserve at least as much respect for their regulatory actions as semisovereign states within our federal system.
The Guidelines' objection based on the alleged difficulty of reviewing
76
foreign regulatory systems is not convincing. In Southern Motor Carriers
different states exercised different types and degrees of supervision over
intrastate trucking rates. Determining whether these regulatory schemes
reflected clearly articulated policy and active supervision posed no special
problems for the Court even though it required factual inquiry into government conduct. The only concern might be an objection by foreign
governments to U.S. courts scrutinizing their conduct at all. However,
such scrutiny can be conducted without significant intrusion, particularly
as the purpose of the scrutiny is to permit deference to foreign law, and
73.
74.
75.
76.

Supra n.3, at 350.
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953).
471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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to determine the fact, rather than the validity, of foreign government
supervision.
F.

THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE

For decades, the courts have ruled that the antitrust laws do not apply
to political activity and thus do not interfere with the right of companies
to petition government officials, even where the petitioning efforts have

anticompetitive goals. 7 7 While the Supreme Court has not yet conclu-

sively decided the question, the substantial weight of authority has supported application of this rule-the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine-to efforts
to petition foreign governments as well as domestic ones. 78 Heretofore,
the Justice Department has supported international application of the
rule.

79

The proposed Guidelines depart from the longstanding Justice Department position by stating that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine "may not
apply to the petitioning of foreign governments" and that only as a matter
of policy will the Department "generally" not prosecute foreign political
activity. 80 Footnotes give prominence to dicta in two lower court decisions
to the effect that Noerr may not apply internationally, 81 and the text

77. E.g., California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf.
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
78. E.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(by implication); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909) ("It
is a contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a
sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and
proper.") (dictum); Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. E.g., Antitrust Guide for International Operations 63 (1977); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1965 Trade Cas. Par. 71,352 § XI(E)(5) (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (consent decree). See also C. Stark, (speech before World Trade Institute seminar on
international antitrust) "Recent InternationalAntitrust Development" 5-10 (May 12, 1983)
(the CoastalStates holding is "eminently sensible" and "is the view the Antitrust Division
has taken for some time").
80. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21597 and 21615.
81. 53 Fed. Reg. 21597 n.129, 21615 n.229.
The Guidelines' citations overstate the weight entitled to the two lower court opinions,
in several respects. The relevant discussion in Occidental Petroleum appears only in dictum
in the district court opinion and played no role in the Ninth Circuit's per curiam affirmance
on other grounds, contrary to what is suggested at 53 Fed. Reg. 21597 n. 129. See Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108 (C.D. Cal.1971), Aff'd per
curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). Australia/
Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference, 537 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1982), dealt with enforcement of a C.I.D. It is, accordingly, hardly dispositive on the scope of Noerr, since even
domestic Noerr activity is subject to discovery and other investigative processes. See e.g.,
Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983);
North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 666 F.2d 50 (4th
Cir. 1981); Stark, supra note 79, at 9 (noting that the Justice Department in the C.I.D.
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suggests further skepticism by emphasizing the First Amendment rationale of the Noerr doctrine, which of course is only one of the several bases
of the doctrine. The most recent and authoritative decision on the issue-

for the Fifth Circuit in Coastal States-is cited
Judge Rubin's decision
82

only as "but see."
The basic rationale of Noerr-Penningtonis that the Sherman Act cannot
reasonably be construed as restricting political activity. First Amendment
considerations play a part in the analysis, but only a part. 83 Use of the

U.S. antitrust laws to regulate foreign political activity could be offensive
to our trading partners, damaging to the ability of U.S. owned multinational firms to operate abroad, 84 and in all likelihood in violation of international law. Treating this simply as an issue of prosecutorial discretion

invites unwarranted treble-damage litigation and leaves the U.S. business
community without the legal guidance that the Guidelines seek to provide.
In fairness to businesses engaged in foreign commerce, acts that would
be protected if done in the United States should have the same treatment
in a United States Court if done abroad. Accordingly, it is recommended
that the Department should reiterate its support for Coastal States and
for the international application of the Noerr doctrine.
II1.

A.

Substantive Antitrust Issues
MERGERS

The draft Guidelines' discussion of mergers focuses on Justice Department enforcement policy and does not discuss established precedent. 85 While as a general matter we question this omission in a guide
used by non-specialists and businessmen, most of the merger analysis is
familiar, since it relies almost solely upon and restates the Department's
86
1984 Merger Guidelines.
shipping litigation agreed with the respondents that Noerr would ultimately shield contacts
with foreign governments from any antitrust liability). Finally, the Guidelines fail to note
that district court's Australia/Easternwas vacated as moot on the government's own motion.
Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference, Nos. 82-1516 & 82-1683 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27,
1986).
82. The Coastal States decision was endorsed in Stark, supra note 79, at 6, in which
the Chief of the Department's Foreign Commerce Section persuasively outlined the merits
of the decision.
83. In its review of the origins and scope of the Noerr doctrine, the Supreme Court's
most recent decision on the subject makes barely a mention of the First Amendment. Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988).
84. Take, for example, Case 15 in the Guidelines. If Alpha, the foreign subsidiary of a
U.S. company, were unable to participate in Country A's advisory council of producers, it
would be severely handicapped in its ability to protect its export position in that country.
85. Moreover, as previously noted, the absence of a coordinated Federal Trade Commission policy on merger enforcement raises a real possibility of dual enforcement standards.
86. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984) (1984 Merger GuideVOL. 23, NO. I
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In one important respect, however, the draft Guidelines diverge even
from their stated goal: they conflict with a key part of the 1984 Merger
Guidelines, the Department's previously announced "internal antitrust
enforcement policies." The result is likely to be confusion and a reduction
87
in the value of the Guidelines as a practical guide.
In the 1984 Merger Guidelines, the Department stated that in highly
concentrated markets-those with a post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) above 1800-it was "likely" to challenge a merger that
increased the HHI by more than fifty points, unless the existence of
specified factors such as ease of entry, a gain in efficiencies, the existence
of foreign competition, or other market conditions reduced the likelihood
that the transaction would substantially lessen competition. 88 In contrast,
where such a merger would increase the HHI by more than 100 points,
the Department stated that these factors would be extremely unlikely to
stave off a challenge, since "only in extraordinary cases will such factors
establish that the merger is not likely to lessen competition." 89
The new Guidelines appear to reveal a change in the latter policy. The
Department now states the proposition the opposite way: not only will it
not virtually "automatically" challenge a merger in a highly concentrated
market causing an increase of more than 100 in the HHI, but it will have
to be convinced, by a "much more extensive analysis" of non-numerical
factors, that "such mergers would create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of market power." 90 This language implies a significant shift in the
presumptions accorded the concentration thresholds, and greatly reduces
the significance of the numerical index itself. While this is probably a
more accurate description of current Division practice than are the 1984
Guidelines, there is a confusion that should be clarified in the final version
of the Guidelines.
B.

JOINT VENTURES

The discussion of joint ventures is helpful, and we have only certain
specific comments. The proposed general Guidelines regarding joint ven-

lines), supra note 10. The only exception is the reference to a speech by Assistant Attorney
General Charles F. Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 21589 n. 65 (June 8, 1988).
Nothing in the draft Guidelines suggests that its merger analysis applies only to international
transactions, and, given the fact that the 1984 Guidelines by their terms apply to both
domestic and international transactions (§ 2.34), there is no particular reason the draft
Guidelines' analysis should differ from the Department's normal merger review process
except to the extent international doctrines described elsewhere in the draft Guidelines (e.g.,
the "comity" -related defenses) would require this result.
87. 53 Fed. Reg. 21584, col. 3.
88. 1984 Merger Guidelines § 3.11 (c), citing factors set forth at §§ 3.2-3.5.
89. Id. § 3.1 (c).

90. 53 Fed. Reg. 21589 n.58.
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tures are reasonable to the extent that they suggest that anticompetitive
effects in the joint venture market are unlikely if a merger of the joint
venture participants would not be considered anticompetitive because the
merger would fall within a "safe harbor" as determined by the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). 9 1 We question, however, the use here of the
phrase "could not be anticompetitive" as failing to make an appropriate
distinction between enforcement policy using the HHI and all conceivable
factual situations.
The two-step analysis proposed for joint ventures involves identifying
and analyzing, first, the joint venture market and, second, any spill-over
markets that might be affected. The last three paragraphs regarding the
step 1 analysis of the joint venture market, 92 however, may go beyond
an appropriate statement of rule of reason analysis in an apparent effort
to cure a past excessive focus on exclusion of competitors. No support
is shown for the proposition that "exclusion from membership in a joint
venture is rarely anticompetitive." That statement appears inconsistent
with analysis by analogy to mergers. Similarly, the next paragraph overstates the situation and appears to exclude rule of reason analysis of the
actual facts by saying, for example, that "selectivity in membership...
generally enhances ...

procompetitive potential," and that "only where

a joint venture is the only one of its kind possible in the relevant market
is there any possibility of concern about the exclusionary effects of limited
membership."
In the discussion of step 2, Spill-Over Markets, 93 the draft guidelines
indicate that the existence of procedural or operational safeguards may
lead to the conclusion, without an elaborate structural analysis, that there
is no threat of anticompetitive effects. If there are no such safeguards,
the Department would, it is stated, examine market concentration and
other relevant economic factors, such as market shares and the existence
of "strong disincentives" for collusion, to determine whether anticompetitive effects may occur. In this respect, the draft Guidelines may not
provide adequate guidance as to when safeguards are necessary or desirable to minimize the risk of such effects.
C.

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

The Sections as a general matter endorse the now widely held view,
reflected in both these Guidelines and the Department's Vertical Restraints Guidelines, that non-price vertical restraints are procompetitive
in the great majority of circumstances.
91. 53 Fed. Reg. 21590, col. 2-3.
92. 53 Fed. Reg. 21590, col. 3 to 21591, col. I.
93. 53 Fed. Reg. 21591, cols. 2 and 3.
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The hypothetical examples in Cases 7 and 8 are applications of the
antitrust law as it has developed since the Sylvania decision, 94 and inForce Report
corporate most of the suggestions made by the 1984 Task
95
of the ABA Antitrust Section on the 1977 Guidelines.
Case 7 outlines how, in the Justice Department's view, appointment of
an exclusive reciprocal foreign distributor does not by itself raise concerns
under the U.S. antitrust laws. It notes that, by contrast with the position
taken in the 1977 Guide (which concluded that such an arrangement would
be illegal per se under the Timken case), the arrangement would be examined to see if it were an unlawful horizontal market allocation or a
possible procompetitive vertical arrangement. If the latter, it would be
analyzed under the rule of reason, applying the standards set out in the
Merger Guidelines.
This approach avoids the over-simplified per se characterization of such
restraints in the 1977 Guide. The draft Guidelines, however, may have
moved too far in the opposite direction without sufficiently elaborate
analysis of potential anticompetitive effects. If, for example, the parties
are direct, actual or potential competitors, there must be some room for
doubt about the initial determination that the arrangement is not an unlawful allocation of markets. While the Timken and Topco cases on which
the Department relied in 1977 have been somewhat eroded through the
years, for example, by the BMI and National Collegiate (Football)cases,

the Supreme Court in the Business Electronics case in 1988 specifically
stated that, "a horizontal agreement to divide territories is per se illegal,"
citing Topco. 9 6 Copperweld limited Timken only with respect to intra97
enterprise conspiracies, and not the holding finding illegal cartel activity.
The Guidelines should make it clear that the appointment of a competitor
as an exclusive distributor is not a risk-free practice.
Footnote 186 refers to a naked restraint on output or price of a related
product, that has no plausible connection to efficiency, as being subject
to careful scrutiny. This is certainly correct, but such a restraint would
be horizontal, and the example does little to illuminate the discussion of
vertical restraints.

Case 8 discusses the use of a distributor for imported products whose
distribution agreement contains territorial and manufacturer restrictions.
94. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
95. See n.1 supra.

96. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Business Electronics Corporation v. Sharp Electronics
Corporation, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
97. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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Again, since it is hypothesized that the manufacturers in question are
"significant, but not dominant," 98 with several other distributors available
to handle products of other manufacturers, the example is a straightforward statement of current law.
Discussion of Justice Department enforcement policy with respect to
distribution in the international context would be much more helpful if
there were a greater elaboration of the risk factors present in distribution
arrangements. Practitioners are now generally aware that non-price vertical restraints are defensible under the antitrust laws; what they need, in
addition to the existing hypotheticals, are practical examples of the possible limits of legality in the international context. This is particularly
important, given the lack of Justice Department enforcement activity in
this area. Discussion of an international distribution arrangement in the
context of an attempted monopolization scheme by a domestic manufacturer, or a viable "raising rivals' costs" scheme, for example, would
provide the kind of helpful information that would make the Guidelines
more valuable.
The Department observes that "Under special market conditions, a
vertical restraint might also result in the anticompetitive exclusion of
revivals from the market by denying them access to an essential input."
A sentence should be added to clarify that, so far as patent licensing is
concerned, denial of access to a patented invention is permissible even
if the invention is an essential input, because of the statutory right of a
patentee to exclude others from the use of its patented invention.
D.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The Guidelines realistically acknowledge the importance of intellectual
property rights in creating and maintaining competition. In general, the
sections dealing with intellectual property are consistent with current law,
and also the comments made by the American Bar Association Task Force
on the 1977 Guide. 99 The Sections nevertheless submit the following
comments.
First, there are some areas where it should be made clearer that the
Guidelines state enforcement policy not the law. For example, it is stated
that a patent or other intellectual property should not be assumed to
delimit the relevant market. 100 While this may be a reasonable expression
of enforcement policy, it should be acknowledged that the law is not
consistent in this area.l10
98. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21607.
99. See n. 1 supra.

100. 53 Fed. Reg. 21594, col. 2.
101. Compare Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985); USM Corp.
v. SPS Technologies Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983);
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The intellectual property sections contain other examples of the same
general problem. For instance, the rule of reason analysis stated in section
I.B.510 2 also appears to be more lenient than traditional rule of reason
analysis. The Department's enforcement analysis looks at the agreement
as a whole and does not consider whether a particular term is more
restrictive than necessary. While we acknowledge the care taken to label
much of this section as the Department's approach, the references to "the
rule of reason" in the first and last paragraphs under the heading "Rule
of Reason Analysis" should be changed to emphasize the internal nature
of the test.
At times, the draft clearly goes beyond accepted law. The statement
that the Department "would generally not be concerned that a horizontal
intellectual property licensing arrangement (for example, a patent pool)
was not opened to competitors," 103 is a case in point. It appears to suggest
that most patent pools are per se legal. While the Guidelines' comment
that "a patentee should not be compelled to forego its statutory right to
exclude ...

because it has chosen not to exclude a few" may be appro-

priate, that factor alone cannot preclude a full rule of reason examination
of all factors. This point is particularly important for a joint venture that
would not survive analysis under merger standards.
Similarly, Case 11 (Exclusive Patent Cross Licenses with Grantbacks)
may overstate the law in at least two important respects. The first occurs
in the analysis of exclusive grantbacks. 1°4 As noted elsewhere in these
comments, exclusive restrictions should be subject to rule of reason analysis. Exclusive and non-exclusive grantbacks can lead to different results,
in the context of the particular license,
and each should be 0 evaluated
5
parties and market.'
Case 11 may also overstate current law with the statement that "If an
outright acquisition of Beta's technology would not violate the antitrust
laws, then either would these licenses violate the law."' 10 6 The Department's position would be better stated as an enforcement judgment that
these cases are so unlikely to pose anticompetitive problems that enforcement action is not justified.
Second, the discussion of joint ventures that include intellectual property elements may at times confuse the reader with respect to enforcement
policy. In step 1, Joint Venture Markets, there is a troublesome inconwith Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 908 (1985).
102. 53 Fed. Reg. 21593, col. 3.

103. 53 Fed. Reg. 21594, col. 2.
104. 53 Fed. Reg. 21611, col. 2.
105. See generally, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, U.S. Antitrust Law and International
Patent and Know-How Licensing, 53-62 (1981) (Monograph No.6).
106. 53 Fed. Reg. 21611, col. 2.
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sistency between the statement that "the actual or potential existence of
four comparable R&D efforts creates a 'safe harbor' "107 and the Merger
Guidelines. Under the Merger Guidelines, there would be an HHI for the
competing producers in this case of over 1650 (assuming the third largest
producer has a 10 percent market share), placing the pre-joint venture
market in the moderate range. The joint venture would raise the HHI by
over 2000 to a post-joint venture HHI exceeding 3600. Thus, it would not
qualify for "safe harbor" treatment. 108 The possibility of four equal R&D
joint ventures, postulated in Case 6, would be likely to have a post-joint
venture HHI in excess of 2500. Traditional analysis would not lead to a
"safe harbor" conclusion in that case either. For these reasons and because five or more similar joint ventures seem unlikely, the proposed
"general rule" regarding four or more comparable R&D efforts should
be reconsidered.
The discussion of Case 6, a Research and Development Joint Venture,
appropriately states that the R&D agreement "should be analyzed as a
joint venture that eliminates horizontal competitors in a relevant R&D
market."1 0 9 We question, however, the unconditional statement that the
licensing agreement should be analyzed as a vertical restraint. The characterization of the licensing agreement as vertical may not be appropriate
because the joint venture is controlled equally by the four owners. Thus,
with the votes of three owners required for a majority (at least two of
which would be U.S. companies) the joint venture appears incapable of
making the independent licensing decisions characteristic of a licensor in
a typical vertical agreement. Furthermore, the statement that joint venture
participants are prohibited from competing with the joint venture in developing related technology (cited in justification of a vertical analysis)
appears at odds with the later argument that the joint venturers are not
prevented from licensing competing technologies. 110 Although freedom
to license competing technologies is one procompetitive factor to be considered in a rule of reason analysis, the continuing restraint on R&D
competition by three of the four largest U.S. companies and their control
of the joint venture may be of competitive significance.

107. 53 Fed. Reg. 21605, col. 2.
108. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21589, nn. 57-58.
109. 53 Fed. Reg. 21604, col. 2. That vertical analysis of the licensing agreement is
mentioned also at the paragraph bridging pages 21605-6, where the Guidelines say that
"These license restrictions are properly analyzed as vertical restrictions because, by the
terms of the joint venture agreement, the joint venture participants are prohibited from
competing with the joint venture in developing related technology," and the footnote says
that "to the extent that any horizontal restraint on technology development was an issue,
it would be resolved in step I of the analysis."
110. 53 Fed. Reg. 21606, col. 1.
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Third, the draft Guidelines at times do not acknowledge that certain
restrictions may hamper rather than help innovation. The first sentence
of footnote 195 in Case 10, Vertical Restraints in a Patent License, says
"If AGPLEX proved to be so superior to uncoated safety eyeglasses that
it truly monopolized the relevant market, then the coordination of competition among producers of AGPLEX-coated eyeglasses would not violate the antitrust laws." ' Il I This does not address the possibility that,
absent such "coordination of competition," one of the licensees might be
more likely to design around the patent. Since the licensees are bound
not to deal in competing products, it is less likely that one of them would
seek to develop an alternative during the term of the AGPLEX patent.
Thus, the sentence quoted above should be stated as a rule of reason
factor rather than as defining a situation as per se legal.
Similarly, the statement that "In general, the cross-licensing of competing or potentially competing technologies is procompetitive because it
expands access to technology"

112

should be rephrased to suggest that

cross-licensing may be procompetitive. It is not always procompetitive,
as the proposed Guidelines now suggest, because cross-licensingespecially with grantbacks-may deter development of alternatives and
may deter each party from licensing a new entrant or relatively weak
participant in the market, either of which might be more procompetitive.
Finally, the Guidelines do not offer sufficient guidance in at least two
instances. The first involves the analysis of technology markets in Case
11. The Department would focus "on the relative efficiency of the available technologies and the time that it would like[ly] take for comparably
efficient alternative technologies to be brought to the market," and would
attempt to "qualitatively assess the likely future strength of such technologies in the market as well as whether alternative technologies would
likely be brought to the market sufficiently promptly, so as to undercut
any attempted exercise of market power."' 113 We question whether the
Department, businesses, or their advisers can make practical assessments
regarding the future availability of alternative technologies with sufficient
accuracy to form a basis for antitrust enforcement decisions and corresponding business decisions.
Second, the discussion of safeguards in cooperative arrangements is
insufficiently comprehensive. In step 2, Spill-Over Markets, Case 6 refers
to the use of safeguards without guidance on when such safeguards should

111.

53 Fed. Reg. 21609.
112. 53 Fed. Reg. 21610, col. 3.
113. 53 Fed. Reg. 21611, col. 3.
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be employed, other than where price and cost data are given to the joint
1 14
venture.
In addition to the four areas outlined above, we would offer the following detailed comments.
The phrase "some exclusive use," used twice at the top of column 3
on page 21593, is unclear. "Exclusive use in a defined area" would be a
better phrase. The definition of a vertical restraint in the second full
,sentence on page 21594 also is unclear.
The introduction to Case 11 (Exclusive Patent Cross-Licenses with
Grantbacks), at page 21610, column 2, concludes with a statement that
"Finally, Alpha and Beta agree that X they produce with the licensed
technology will not be marketed in the home country of the other party."
Since this case deals with patents, we suggest that "with the licensed
technology" be changed to "under the patent license." Similarly, the
analysis of "Restriction on Competition between Licensor and Licensee"
beginning at column 2 on page 21611 should be directed to patented technology. Besides the point that technology licenses are discussed in Case
12, and not in Case 11, it is important for the discussion as a whole to
make clear the right of a U.S. patent holder to bind a foreign licensee not
to sell products manufactured under its patent license in the United
States. 115
The restriction on the use of competing technologies, that Amer-Eye
not use any other coating on its safety glasses, is said by the Department
to be procompetitive. However, the restriction goes beyond the scope of
the patent and would appear to use the monopoly of the patent to prevent
manufacture in other fields and possibly to be illegal. The calculation of
royalties based on AmerGlass's total sales, including non-patented eye
glasses, might also be illegal under the Supreme Court holding in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,1 16 that a patentee cannot "coerce
an agreement to pay a percentage royalty on merchandise not employing
the discovery which the claims of the patent define." That case should
be mentioned in the draft Guidelines.
While Case 11 appears to be based on the right of a patent owner to
exclude others, the patent owner's rights in Case 11 are limited because
the case refers to process patents rather than product patents. As the case

114. See discussion at III.B. supra.
115. I Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative

Guide, 388-389 (2d Ed. 1986):
"Contractual restrictions on foreign licensees not to export to the United States
(import bans) and restrains on U.S. licensees not to export (export bans) have
been almost invariably upheld where they are not part of a cartel."
116. 395 U.S. 100 (1969) at 140.
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acknowledges in the paragraph on Restriction on Competition between
Licensor and Licensee, beginning at the middle of column 2 on page 21611,
importation and sale in the United States of a product manufactured
outside the United States by a patented process does not infringe the U.S.
process patent, although other relief may be available.
If Case 11 is intended to deal with technology which is fully protected
by U.S. patents, the example would be clarified by referring to product
patents rather than process patents. Product patents probably should be
mentioned in the case in any event. If the intent is to deal with the more
difficult issue of process patents under current U.S. law, the analysis
should discuss how the ownership of such patents affects the Department's analysis.
Case 12 (Know-how Technology Transfer Agreement with Exclusive
Territories) makes the welcome statement that restrictions may be more
necessary in a know-how license (because of the absence of statutory
protection) than in a patent license. However it fails to direct sufficient
attention to the importance and useful life of the know-how as factors in
evaluating a know-how license under the rule of reason.
The analogy to merger analysis, used throughout the proposed Guidelines, has less relevance where, as in Case 12, the license is for a limited
period. That factor should be mentioned in Case 12.
E.

TRADE LAW

As the proposed Guidelines note, trade laws and antitrust laws are often
in conflict: trade laws are designed to protect U.S. industries from certain
foreign competition, while the antitrust laws are designed to promote
competition. These conflicting policies, moreover, are administered by
different agencies of the U.S. government, with different statutory mandates and political agendas. The Guidelines, we believe, inadequately
address this tension between trade and antitrust law and policies, and the
antitrust issues that can arise in a U.S. trade law context.
Most importantly, we believe that the Guidelines present an incorrect
characterization of the legal significance, under the antitrust laws, of U.S.
government involvement in export decisions made by overseas firms. The
Guidelines (specifically Case 16) state that "[flor reasons of comity ...
the Department would not likely challenge a voluntary export restraint
that clearly arose from the decision and official action of the government
of A in response to specific trade concerns expressed by the U.S. government" (emphasis added). 117 We believe this exaggerates the legal sig-

117. 53 Fed. Reg. 21616, col. 1.
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nificance of any action by U.S. government officials to encourage
"voluntary export restraints" by exporters, particularly in a context in
which, stripped of any comity considerations, a likely per se antitrust
offense is being committed by exporters to the U.S. in their agreement
to restrain export volumes or adhere to certain pricing guidelines.
The issue is an important one, since the past several decades have
witnessed several significant efforts by U.S. government trade officials
to limit or otherwise manage the volume or price of exports to the United
States. In 1968, for example, a voluntary steel export restraint agreement
was negotiated by the U.S. government with European and Japanese steel
producers to forestall possible quota legislation by Congress. In 1981, the
Japanese government imposed restraints on exports by its automobile
manufacturers, with the encouragement of the U.S. government, following the rejection of a petition for import relief filed by domestic auto
interests. In 1982 the EC agreed with the U.S. to limit exports of steel
to the U.S. And in 1986, the Japanese and U.S. governments entered into
a comprehensive agreement designed to prevent and monitor dumping of
Japanese semiconductor chips in the U.S.
Antitrust concerns were raised in all four situations and, in the three
in which the Department of Justice expressed its views, no mention was
made of the legal significance of the role of U.S. government involvement
in the export restraints. In the Japanese automobile case, Attorney General Smith opined only that the Japanese government's involvement would
likely support a sovereign compulsion defense to antitrust liability.'t 8 In
the semiconductor chip case, the Acting Attorney General stated that
antitrust liability would not attach to certain pricing arrangements between
a Japanese producer and a U.S. related party, if that related party were
owned and controlled by the Japanese producer/exporter; comity was not
mentioned. 119 In the third case, Assistant Attorney General Baxter stated
merely that, on the basis of the EC's "representation" that the restrictions
would be mandatory controls imposed by governmental entities acting
within their sovereign powers, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense
would apply. 120 In the other case, involving the 1968 steel import restraints, antitrust concerns were raised in private litigation challenging
those restraints. The District Court in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.

Rogers 12 1 stated indictum that the Executive Branch could not confer

118. 1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) Par. 63,998 (1981).

119. 25 I.L.M. 1428 (1986).
120. See exchange of letters dated October 21, 1982 between Sir Roy Denman (Head of
the Delegation of the EC Commission) to William F. Baxter (Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division).
121. 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973).
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antitrust immunity on the export restraint arrangement it had negotiated.
The Court of Appeals vacated that portion of the District Court's opinion
on grounds of mootness (because the antitrust claims had been withdrawn), 122 and ultimately legislation23was adopted conferring antitrust immunity on the steel arrangements.1
In the automobile case the restraints were imposed pursuant to apparent
official foreign government action. In the others, foreign firms appear to
have agreed (often with encouragement or at the instigation of their government, and in each case with active U.S. government involvement) or
complied with their respective governments' policy to restrain exports to
the U.S. In none of these cases were the actions of U.S. officials relied
on or found to be a basis for antitrust immunity, and the Guidelines
themselves cite no authority for their assertion that the discretionary,
nonstatutory activities of a U.S. trade official can be the basis for a defense
to otherwise unlawful horizontal behavior.
The comity discussion in Case 16 should not therefore suggest to foreign
companies that their otherwise objectionable behavior can be immunized
from Department of Justice antitrust enforcement because a U.S. trade
official suggested that they enter into a voluntary export restraint agreement. Such a result would be a departure from the position enunciated
at page 22 of the 1977 Guide that informal encouragement by a senior
U.S. government official "would not convey any sort of antitrust exemption." In fact, the only difference between Case 14 (International
Cartel Activities, in which the Guidelines find an unlawful cartel), and
Case 16 (in which an arguably horizontal export restraint agreement is
not challenged) is that in the latter a U.S. government trade official suggested that the trade restraint be entered into. It is hard to understand
how the conduct in Case 16 can avoid U.S. antitrust prosecution unless
of the
it meets a Parkerstandard as involving a clearly articulated policy 124
government.
that
by
monitoring
ongoing
with
government
foreign
In practical terms, an approach to foreign governments to implement
export restraints, minimum export prices or similar controls, such as
occurred in the above examples, may be no more than an expression of
an enforcement position by U.S. government agencies with trade responsibilities, and not a U.S. government position in which, inter alia,

122. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 2485.
124. It is curious, and perhaps inconsistent, that the draft Guidelines set forth a foreign
sovereign compulsion standard stricter than that for domestic "state action," while allowing
the antitrust laws to be overridden by activities of a U.S. trade official that have no legislative
basis at all.
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competition law and policy considerations have been addressed. While
the Justice Department might decline to prosecute in such a case for
political or diplomatic reasons, the informal involvement of U.S. trade
antitrust claims
officials would not protect the foreign companies from
25
brought by private parties or state attorneys general.1
A second trade/antitrust law concern raised by the proposed Guidelines
is their inadequate attention to the antitrust implications of participation
in trade law proceedings by U.S. firms. Case 17-Settling a Trade Casediscusses only the narrow situation of a price-fixing agreement entered
into to "settle" an antidumping case. In noting that no antitrust exemption
would apply to such an arrangement, because done outside the provisions
of the antidumping law, the Guidelines state further that no antitrust
exemption would extend "to any anticompetitive provisions in a suspension agreement (i.e., to one done pursuant to statutory settlement pro26
cedures) that were not necessary to comply with the antidumping law." 1
Since an antidumping suspension agreement (under 19 U.S.C. § 1673c)
is inherently anticompetitive (requiring either quantitative limits on or
cessation of exports, or an increase in prices), it would have been helpful
to know what the Department had in mind in referring to anticompetitive
provisions that were not necessary to comply with the law.
The Guidelines should also address antitrust issues that can arise during
the prosecution of a trade law case. Proceedings under antidumping, countervailing duty and escape clause (Section 201) laws concern the effect of
imports on the competing U.S. industry. Assuming that the trade law
proceeding is not a sham under Noerr, questions exist concerning how
much members of a U.S. industry may cooperate in prosecuting a trade
case without incurring antitrust liability. Noerr and the statutory remedies
provided by the trade laws themselves would appear to confer authorization for some such cooperation which could, with appropriate protective
measures, include exchange of data and collaboration on the presentation
of an "injury" case. A similar authorization of limited cooperation would
appear to extend to exporters who are respondents in a trade law proceeding to allow them to cooperate in their defense and possibly in the
negotiations of any suspension agreement.

125. Cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378-791 (1973); National
Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). The Department of Justice in 1983 issued CIDs to U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese semiconductor
companies that had allegedly fixed prices after meeting with a high U.S. Commerce Department official who urged the companies to take steps to avoid dumping into the United
States. See also p. 22 of the 1977 Guide, referred to above.
126. 53 Fed. Reg. 21616, col. 3.
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Conclusion
The publication of an up-to-date and detailed statement of the Department's policy in this area is welcomed, and should be of substantial assistance to organizations, and their advisers, involved in transnational
operations of the kind dealt with by the draft Guidelines. The Sections
hope that the comments in this report will be seriously considered by the
Department in the preparation of a final version of the Guidelines that
provides comprehensive guidance on these issues.
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